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TOPICS AND THEMES TREATED IN THE DIALOGUES
denied that one could have many close 
friends ( Nicomachean Ethics 9.10). But 
unlike Aristotle, Plato did not investigate 
such friendship systematically, though he no 
doubt appreciated it: Socrates much admires, 
for example, the bond between Lysis and his 
agemate Menexenus. When he visits Socrates 
in jail, Crito affirms that he will never again 
find such a companion ( Crito 44B), and tries 
to convince Socrates to let him bribe the 
jailer, since it is shameful to value money 
more than friends. But for Socrates evad-
ing the law is wrong, and so he refuses the 
aid proffered by his friends. So too, Phaedo 
assures Echecrates that Socrates died in the 
presence of many friends ( Phd . 58C), but he 
is amazed that Socrates conversed with them 
unsentimentally, as on any other day (58E–
59A). Though Socrates may have described 
himself, tongue in cheek, as an expert in  ta 
erôtika , when it came to  philia what most 
interested him, and Plato, was the love of 
wisdom or  philosophia . 
 GOODNESS (THE GOOD, AGATHON) 
 Rafael Ferber 
 The good is for the Platonic Socrates that for 
which everything is done (cf.  Gorgias 468b). 
This is an ‘axiom’ to which Plato seems to 
adhere during his whole writing career (cf. 
 Symposium 205e–206a,  Republic 505d–e, 
 Philebus . 65a). But the Socratic good 
becomes for Plato in the  R . the idea of the 
good, which is also the ‘greatest thing to be 
learned’ and the ‘greatest lesson’ ( megiston 
mathêma ,  R . 505a, 519c). 
 We may find a first allusion to this idea in 
the  Lysis in ‘what we like in the first place’ 
( prôton philon ,  Ly . 219d), cf. Penner and 
Rowe (2005:278–9). The  Politicus may touch 
on this idea under the title of the ‘exact itself’ 
(284d; cf. Ferber 2002:190). But the idea of 
the good is treated explicitly only in the sixth 
and seventh book of the  R . in the course of 
three similes, though caution is warranted: 
the Platonic Socrates gives in these similes 
only his ‘opinions without science’ ( R . 506c) 
and even these opinions are incomplete 
(506e1–3). First, he distances himself from 
existing philosophical conceptions of the 
good, where the good consists in pleasure or in 
knowledge (cf. 505b–c). Both conceptions are 
refuted, one because there are also bad pleas-
ures (cf.  Grg .499c6–7), the other because this 
conception would be circular (cf.  Euthyphro 
292e3): knowledge would be knowledge of 
something, namely, the good. Second, the 
Platonic Socrates says positively three things 
about the good: (a) it is not sought like ‘just 
and beautiful things’ (505d), where we may 
be satisfied also with the appearance, but as 
something which really is good. So we may 
be conventionalists concerning the ‘just and 
beautiful things’, but we are realists concern-
ing the good. We want not the apparent, but 
the real good. (b) It is the final cause of all 
that is good in desire and action (517b7–c4). 
(c) The knowledge of the idea of the good is 
the condition of the knowledge of just and 
the beautiful things, that is, the ideas of jus-
tice and beauty (506a). This means that if 
the ideas of justice and beauty were not also 
good, they would not be ideas of real but 
only of apparent justice and beauty. Since 
without knowledge of the idea of the good 
no other knowledge is of any use to us (cf. 
505a2–3), knowledge of apparent justice and 
apparent beauty would not be of any use to 
us. Therefore knowledge of the idea of the 
good is required to know the goodness and 
usefulness of just and beautiful things. 
 These two negative and three positive (for-
mal) determinations are supplemented by the 
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substantive description which the Platonic 
Socrates gives in the three similes. Common 
to them is that the idea of the good figures as 
cause (q.v.;  aitia , 508e3.517b2) or principle 
( archê , 510b7). In the simile of the sun (q.v.), 
it functions as the cause of knowledge, truth 
and being, although it is itself not being ( ouk 
ousias ontos tou agathou , 509b8–9), but 
‘surpasses the being in dignity and power’ 
( epekeina tês ousias presbeia kai dynamei 
hyperechontos , 505b9–10). Thus Plato seems 
to found his ontology and epistemology on 
a supreme principle which – if the cause is 
not the same as that which is caused – must 
be ‘something else and more beautiful than 
knowledge and truth’ (508e5–6) and being 
(but cf. Baltes 1997; Ferber 2005; Seel 2007). 
We can see in this description of the good 
the inauguration of the problem of the third 
between and above being and thinking: As 
light and its master, the sun, functions as 
a third item ( R . 507d.e), so the idea of the 
good functions as a third item between and 
above thinking and being. In the simile of the 
line (q.v.), the idea of the good, though not 
mentioned there, functions as an unhypo-
thetical principle  (anhypothetos archê ) of the 
mathematical ‘presuppositions’ ( hypotheseis , 
510c6), that is, the four arts of the  quadri-
vium (on the text of the simile cf. Lafrance 
l994; on interpretations between l804 and 
l984, Lafrance l987). 
 The image of the cave (q.v.) shows us what 
education means for Plato. It is ‘a leading of 
the soul’ ( psychês periagogê , 521c1) that is 
also a return of the soul’s attention to the 
really good. But the idea of the good func-
tions also as a principle of Plato’s politics so 
that not only every soul in her private life, 
but ‘anyone who is to act sensibly in pri-
vate or public must see it’ (510c). Because 
the philosopher-kings and -queens know the 
really good, they will also, in the sense of the 
Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge, 
realize the good in the city (on all three simi-
les cf. Ferber 1984:49–166, 1989:49–219; 
Schindler 2008:139–75). 
 The  Phlb . starts with the search for a cer-
tain state of the soul which can render the 
life of all human beings happy (cf.  Phlb . 
11d4–6). But it asks nevertheless the Socratic 
question ‘. . . what in fact is the good . . .’ 
(13e5–6) and holds on to a ‘single form’ ( mia 
idea ) of the good (65a1), which Socrates tries 
to hold down with the conjunction of three 
qualities ( poia ): ‘beauty, symmetry and truth’ 
(65a2; cf. Ferber 2010). In his old age, Plato 
seems to have held a public ‘lecture on the 
good’, although this lecture may go back 
to earlier ‘seminars’ or ‘ synousiai ’ ‘on the 
good’. (cf. Simplicius,  in Aristotelis Physica 
commentaria Phlb . 542.1012, 545.24). After 
an anecdote reported by Aristoxenos about 
Aristotle, the hearers of the lecture expected 
to be told
 . . . something about one of the recog-
nized human goods, such as wealth, 
health or strength, or, in sum, some mar-
velous happiness. But when it appeared 
that Plato was to talk  on mathemat-
ics and numbers and geometry and 
astronomy , leading up to the statement 
that there the good is one ( hoti tagaton 
estin hen ), they were overwhelmed by 
the paradox of the whole matter. Some 
then thought little of the thing and oth-
ers even reproved it. (Aristoxenus,  The 
Elements of Harmony II) 
 In this lecture, Plato may have presented the 
idea on the good in a dialectical way, where 
unity as we find it in the abstract structures 
of mathematics may have played a signifi-
cant role (cf. Burnyeat 2000). From this lec-
ture, only fragments from notes taken by his 
hearers, especially from Aristotle, survive 
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(cf. the collection of fragments in Gaiser 
l963:441–557; Isnardi-Parente l997:406–84, 
l998:5–115; Krämer 1990:203–17). But we 
find in Aristotle’s  Metaphysics a ‘short and 
principal’ summary (987a27, 988a17) of 
the public lecture whose content Plato may 
have already communicated earlier to his 
advanced students (cf. Ferber 1989:211–16). 
 HAPPINESS (EUDAIMONIA) 
 Rachana Kamtekar 
 In contemporary usage, ‘happiness’ is some-
times taken to be a feeling, as temporary or 
permanent as feelings are. In ancient Greek 
usage, in contrast,  eudaimonia , the term 
translated ‘happiness’, characterizes a whole 
life and not just a moment of feeling, and has 
an objective dimension: the happy life not 
only feels good to the one who lives it, but is 
good. Sometimes translators use ‘flourishing’ 
instead; one ground for this is that not only 
humans, but other species as well, are said to 
flourish when they are in a good condition 
relative to their capacities, but it was for the 
ancients a philosophical issue whether  eudai-
monia ought to be conceived this way, and 
indeed whether a life of pleasure not only 
feels good to the one who lives it but also 
is the best life; the same philosophical issue 
arises today about happiness, and it cannot 
be settled by a translation (see Kraut 1979). 
 Plato takes it as uncontroversial that all 
of us wish to be happy, that is, to live well 
( Euthydemus 278e;  Meno 78a–b;  Symposium 
205a). He does not mean by this that we 
wish that our desires, whatever they are, 
be satisfied; rather, happiness requires pos-
sessing, and correctly using, genuinely good 
things ( Euthd . 280d). But happiness is not 
divorced from desire-satisfaction either, for 
we all do in fact desire the genuinely good 
things obtaining which will make us happy 
( Gorgias 468b;  Men . 77b–78b;  Republic 
505d–e); evidence of this includes our pur-
suit of what appears good, our loss of desire 
for things once we learn they are not good, 
and our efforts to determine what really is 
good. 
 What are the genuinely good things the 
possession and correct use of which make 
us happy? In the  Philebus , Socrates argues 
that the good or happy human life con-
tains a mixture of knowledge and pleasure 
( Phlb . 20d–22a). In the  Grg . (470e) and  R . 
bk 1 (354a), Socrates says that our happi-
ness depends entirely on whether or not we 
are virtuous, but at other times he makes the 
weaker claim that having virtue makes one 
happier than any of those who lack virtue, 
no matter what else they have and one lacks 
( R . 360e–62c, 387d, 392cd, 580b). The com-
parative claim allows nonmoral goods, such 
as health and wealth, to contribute to the vir-
tuous person’s happiness. (The case that the 
 R . makes only this ‘comparative’ claim about 
happiness’ relationship to virtue is made in 
Irwin 1995:191–3 and contested in Annas 
1999:84–7; the alternatives for relating hap-
piness and virtue are canvassed in Vlastos 
1999.) To explain  how virtue contributes to 
happiness, the  R . (443d–444e) describes jus-
tice as a harmonious condition of soul, anal-
ogous to health for the body and wisdom as 
the perfection of our best capacity, reason, in 
knowledge of the forms and especially of the 
form of the good ( R . 518c–d, 504e–5a). In 
both cases, the happiness described involves 
both the satisfaction of desires and the pos-
session of some genuinely good thing(s). 
 On the grounds that happiness consists in 
contemplation of the forms, an activity which 
is interrupted by our bodily condition, Plato 
sometimes (e.g.  Phaedo, Phaedrus ) seems to 
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